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IV 
bstract 
e Kenyan economy, like many other economies in the world, is sensitive to the political events that occur. In 
odem day, economies with stable political environments and efficient economic policies have strong and 
falthy economies and are a big draw for investors. Stable exchange rates are an indicator of good economic 
·rformance. 
is paper examines the effect of political risk in Kenya on the volatility of exchange rates. It uses daily time 
ies data of the Euro and USD exchange rates that covers a period from June 2007 to August 2013. The period 
vers three major political events; the 2007 general election, the 2010 constitutional referendum and the 2013 
fneral election. This study uses a TGARCH(1,1) with a dummy variable for political risk. Results from the 
ta analysis show that political risk has significant effects on the volatilities of the Euro and USD exchange 
es. Recommendations on additional studies are made. First, a possible study can be done to investigate the 
ect of political risk on additional exchange rates e.g. the Japanese yen (JPY), the British pound (GBP), etc. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Background 
1.1 Exchange Rate 
exchange rate is the rate of transfer between two currencies. It is also called the foreign exchange rate or 
rex rate. An exchange rate is also the value of one's currency to another currency O'sullivan & Sheffrin 
008). An individual or entity may feel the need to trade to and from a particular currency for some reasons. 
ese reasons are majorly classified into three: transactions, speculation, and arbitrage. 
entity may have the need to buy or sell currencies in the currency market to enter and fulfill transactions. 
r example, in the case of a traveler, they may need to buy foreign currency when going abroad and sell it 
ce they return. For a multinational, it may have inflows and outflows in a variety of currencies and will need 
convert them. Similarly, for both individuals and institutions, to imp01t or export goods and services may 
ed to exchange currencies accordingly. 
eculation can best be defmed as trading in an asset that has a significant risk oflosing most or all of the initial 
tlay with the expectation of a substantial gain RAJKUMAR & RANI (2012). If there is a risk ofloss, it will 
se the question as to why speculate at all. But this risk of speculation is still taken up by market participants 
there is a possibility of making massive profits. "Just as mountain climbers scale mountains because the 
untain simply exists, speculators look for profit opportunity simply because it can occur" Dedek & Gregor 
. 94). Arbitragers on the other hand attempt to make a riskless profit from a mispricing in the market. 
1 wever, transactions would cause a shift in demand and supply correcting the mispricing. Any meaningful 
crepancy would offer arbitrage trading opportUnities for large traders, which would quickly eliminate the 
parity Levich (1985). 
e foreign exchange rate is an essential determinant of any country's relative economic health level, ceteris 
·bus (with other factors unchanging such as interest rates and inflation rates) Munthali, Simwaka, & Mwale 
1 0). A stable exchange rate is an indicator of good economic health and comes with its benefits . 
. 1.1 Benefits of a stable exchange rate 
stable exchange rate is advantageous for firms that participate in international trade. It reduces their foreign 
~hange risk: 
• Transaction exposure: this is the risk that a firm may face after having already entered into an obligation. 
This may arise where they are being paid in a foreign currency or expect to make a payment in a foreign 
1 
currency. The timing of the payments or receipts may lead to a gain or loss depending on the prevailing 
exchange rates. 
Translation exposure: this is the risk faced by multinational companies that the value of their fmancial 
statement items (i.e. profits, assets, etc.) may change during consolidation. The degree of this type of 
exposure is dependent on the accounting methods and principles used. 
• Economic exposure: this is the risk that a company's competitive position may be compromised since 
exchange rate fluctuations may have altered future cash flows. It is long term~ and so are its effects. 
Economic exposure does not affect only firms that participate in international trade, but also local firms. 
In this case, a company may have reduced profitability if the exchange rates favor importation of a 
cheaper substitute for its good/service. 
able exchange rates reduce the exposure of firms to foreign currency risks. It will also reduce the costs they 
ur from activities meant to mitigate, transfer or hedge against this risks. 
e theory of purchasing power parity describes the relationship between exchange rates and inflation. 
erefore, a stable exchange rate will be beneficial as inflation too will stabilize. 
e international Fischer effect describes the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates. This, 
refore, implies that a stable exchange rate will promote stable interest rates. Stable interest rates encourage 
reign investment. A high volatility in interest rates is usually an indication of high-risk countries. Due to the 
k -averse nature of investors, they would prefer an assured return and therefore invest in countries with a 
ble interest rate. 
wever, investors may still prefer to invest in high-risk countries as the investment attracts a high return 
ceri & Borelli (2008). They argue that FDI depends more on the openness of the economy rather than the 
atility of exchange rates captured in its standard deviation. Obstfeld & Rogoff (2000) posit that the more 
en an economy; they should ideally have a less volatile real exchange rate. Their intuition being rather 
aightforward that a less volatile exchange rate gives higher FDI. However, if the theory of international 
:;her effect holds, there would be no preference for either high risk or low risk since whatever gains achieved 
m a higher interest rate would be offset by the exchange rate during conversion. 
r these reasons, countries attempt to stabilize their exchange rates. There has been the argument of whether 
ed or floating exchange rate offers a more stable exchange rate. Countries with a floating rate leave the forces 
demand and supply to work and only intervene mainly through monetary policy whenever they feel that 
llilibrium is running away. Radelet & Sachs (1999) argue that the Asian Crises were supported by the pegged 
·hange rate. They argue that the stability of their exchange rate led to a false sense of security for investors 
.ich led to the over-accumulation ofunhedged foreign currency debt, giving rise to the fmancial crises. 
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1.1.2 Political Risk 
There have been many definitions of political risk in business and finance literature. From these many 
defmitions, all seem to agree that it is the unwanted consequence of political activities Bernhard & Leblang 
(2006); Frieden (2002); OCHIENG (2013). 
Political instability is rather difficult to quantify since it is more subjective than objective in nature. The degree 
of political risk is based on the perceptions and opinions of the public. 
There exists a myriad of events that can be said to give rise to political risk. Foreign exchange markets are 
particularly sensitive to political events, for example, war and unrest, withdrawal of republics to create new 
sovereignties and threat of a country break-up. 
Those most specific to Kenya include: 
1.1.2.1 Government action and inaction 
According to Frieden (2002), electoral periods pose uncertainty as there may be power shifts, and policies may 
be changed to favor those in power. Results frorn this study; conducted in 14 OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries indicate that periods of election, in particular, affect the 
average annual depreciation rates and coefficients of variation 
1.1.2.2 Political events: Elections and referenda 
Markets react differently to political uncertainty. The following are reactions that are attributed to political 
instability: deterioration of Economic performance, a decrease in Foreign direct investment, an increased 
volatility oflnterest rates and higher inflation Alesina & Perotti (1996); Brada, Kutan, & Yigit (2006); Henisz 
(2002). In most instances, political uncertainty is present in less developed countries for which fmancial 
information is not always reliable. 
Evidence suggests that political uncertainty leads to a decline in the value of a country's currency. This 
increases in the foreign exchange bid-ask spread and in the volatility of foreign exchange rates Brada, Kutan, & 
Zhou (1993); Bussiere & Mulder (1999); Crowley & Loviscek (2002); Kutan & Zhou (1995); Melvin & Tan 
(1996). Kenya in particular experiences increased levels of political instability is in election and referenda 
years. 
Investors, both local and foreign develop a wait and see attitude. After the 2007 and 2008 PEV; the fear of 
insecurity arises. A common skewed perception of the country's security situation may lead to the preference to 
hold foreign cuiTency rather than local cUITency increasing volatility and bid-ask spread. 
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1.1.2.3 Political news dominates headlines 
The media plays an important role in painting a picture for the general public. They influence greatly people's 
opinions and perceptions; especially print media. Opinion polls may not correctly predict election winners. 
Economic actors may try and predict future policies based on the news and polls. 
1.1.2.4 Possibility of dramatic political reforms 
As elections approach, the incumbent government may try enhancing its popularity by manipulating policy to 
produce short-term expansions in economic activity. 
On the flip side, there may be changes in government structure if the opposition wins the election or if new 
individuals are selected to occupy leadership positions. This would bring about differing ideologies and 
different priorities. Similarly, there exists the possibility of the new leadership attempting to make the previous 
government look bad by briefly imposing bad policies before changing them. 
If there is uncertainty regarding the value of the currency in future, people will prefer to hold less of the weaker 
or rather weakening currency and hold more of the strengthening currency. The demand for Kshs goes down, 
and that of the dollar etc. goes up. As the dynamics of demand and supply keep adjusting, the variance should 
grow accordingly. 
If there is uncertainty regarding the election, there will be a range of expectations of exchange rates. 
1.1.3 Kenya's Background: Political Risk and Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
Potter, Kniss, Riesenfeld, & Johnson (2010) identify certain structural weaknesses in the Kenyan government as 
the main influence of the repeated conflicts after presidential elections. According to a survey done by KNHCR, 
in 2007 out of the 210 constituencies, 136 faced violence after the elections. However, this was not anything 
new as there has been a conflict after every presidential election led in the country (1992, 1997, and 2002). 
In 2013, despite the conflict raised by the opposition party questioning the credibility of the results of the just-
completed election, there was no violence. This may be attributed to the fact that both parties and the public had 
confidence in the country's judicial system as a good conflict resolution mechanism. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
There have been only two empirical studies done for the Kenyan case concerning the effect of political risk on 
exchange rate volatility. Ntwiga (2012) in this study did an analysis of election violence shocks on the exchange 
rates using GARCH methodology. In his study, he used daily time series data from January 2007 to December 
2008. OCHIENG (2013) in this study conducted an event study with daily time series data for the period 
between May 2010 and April 2013. Both studies were short-term and hence the importance of undertaking this 
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study. There is no empirical research focusing on the effect of political instability on exchange rates in the long 
run that is specific to Kenya. 
1.3 Research Objective 
To investigate the effect political risk has on exchange rates in Kenya. 
1.4 Research Question 
What effects does political risk have on exchange rates in Kenya? 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
This study is of significance to investors and multinational corporations as it will provide knowledge that will 
be useful when taking foreign currency positions. Similarly, to reduce their foreign exchange exposure, it will 
be useful when making hedging strategies. It will also provide the knowledge necessary for them to decide on 
the policies to use to mitigate political risk. 
Policymakers would fmd this study of significance when assessing monetary policy and fiscal policy their 
possible effects. This is especially to reduce the effects that political risk may have to maintain stable exchange 
rates. Similarly, there is an increased competition between developing countries to obtain FDI and thus 
increasing the pressure on policymakers. 
Students and researchers in the field would find this study very useful. So far, very little research has been in 
Kenya addressing the issue of political risk on exchange rate volatility. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1. Determinants of exchange rates 
In an attempt to determine the causes of movement in exchange rates, some theories were developed. These 
theories give an intuition of how factors: economic or otherwise; influence exchange rates. Those that inform 
this study are discussed below: 
2.1.1. International Parity Conditions 
International parity conditions offer a very simple explanation of how economic factors relate to exchange rates. 
These economic relationships between these variables and equilibrium exchange rates are called parity 
conditions. Its simplicity is its assumption of a perfect market i.e. no government intervention, no taxes and no 
transfer costs. 
2.1.2. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
Purchasing power parity is a theory which states that foreign exchange rates are in equilibrium when their 
purchasing power is similar in the two countries. Its basis is formed in the law of one price which implies that 
the prices of similar goods should be equal even when expressed in different currencies. This is under the 
assumption of a perfect market with no international barriers and no transaction costs. 
PPP comes in two forms: 
2.1.2.1. Absolute form PPP 
The law of one price has a direct implication that the price of goods would differ in transportation costs alone 
through the activities of arbitrage. However, this would only hold if the goods were identical. In reality, goods 
are not perfectly homogenous. 
The main limitation of this theory is the difficulty in comparing prices of goods between different countries. 
This is because a perfect market is only theoretical in the sense that transport costs, barriers to trade and 
transaction costs have a significant impact on price in reality. Similarly, the difference in the market conditions, 
for example, the cost of labor, between the two countries may cause the prices of goods to vary. Absolute PPP 
only relies on the analysis of mobile goods and prices of goods such as real estate cannot be included in the 
analysis. 
2.1.2.2. Relative PPP 
Relative PPP proposes that changes in exchange rates should be equal to changes in the price i.e. inflation. It 
has been a concern that PPP does not always hold in the short run. However, it has been assumed that such 
deviations are temporary Baillie & McMahon( 1990). These deviations reflect an overshooting of exchange rates 
that arise due either to indirect rate variability or the destabilizing effects of speculation. As a consequence, 
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deviations from PPP can be seen as an indication of excess volatility in exchange rates which should be 
regulated by official intervention Eichengreen (1992). 
Many of those using the PPP as criteria have the presumption that substantial deviations from PPP in the short 
run may be caused by a myriad of factors- such as adjustment lags arid capital flows. However, in the long run, 
exchange rates will return to the equilibrium as predicted by PPP. Thus, avoiding unnecessary exchange rate 
fluctuations in the short rub could simply be done by intervening to maintain the approximate equilibrium 
exchange rate as predicted by PPP. 
2.1.3. International Fischer Effect (IFE) 
The International Fischer Effect theory explains the relationship between spot exchange rates and interest rates. 
According to Bers & Madura(2000), ifiFE holds, high-interest rates call for weaker currencies. This theory also 
suggests that the differences between the nominal exchange rates of two countries will tend to be equated by 
their spot exchange rate changes. Demirag & Goddard (1994). 
2.1.4. Interest Rate Parity 
Interest rate parity shows the relationship between interest rates and forward exchange rates. The theory 
specifies that if nominal interest rates in a country are high, then the forward rate for the cun·ency of a country 
with a lower nominal interest rate should be at a premium sufficient to prevent arbitrage. 
Interest rate parity is a no-arbitrage condition that represents a state of equilibrium where investors will be 
indifferent to interest rates available on bank deposits in different countries Joshi, Azuma, & Feenstra (2008). 
2.1.5. Unbiased Forward Rates 
Unbiased forward rates specify that the forward rate should be an unbiased estimator of the future spot rates of 
exchange rates. This implies that forex markets are unbiased. 
The relationship between spot exchange rates and forward exchange rates may also be influenced by politics. In 
a study conducted by Bernhard & Leblang (2002), they show that during election campaign periods, cabinet 
negotiations and cabinet dissolutions, forward exchange rates are a based estimator of future exchange rates. A 
direct implication of this study is that the unbiased forward rate theory does not hold during periods of political 
uncertainty, especially elections. 
2.1.6. Government Controls 
The government attempts to regulate the economy through macroeconomic policies (especially monetmy and 
fiscal policy). Countries may use macroeconomic policies with the aim of manipulating economic variables: 
exchange rates, interest rates, inflation, the balance of payments, GDP. However, it is necessary to note that 
even when macroeconomic policies are not being implemented to regulate exchange rates, changes in the other 
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economic variables will cause a change in the exchange rates. Therefore, it would coiTect to say that 
government controls affect exchange rate volatility either directly or indirectly. 
An expansionary monetary policy will cause a decline in exchange rate since the local currency depreciates. A 
contractionary monetary policy will cause an opposite reaction; the local cun·ency appreciates, and the 
exchange rate will rise. However, some argue that expansionary monetary policy, in the long run, has 
destabilizing effects. A high money supply causes both a lower exchange rate and inflation. For a country with a 
negative balance of payments, it would be extremely detrimental as it would worsen the trade deficit. Fiscal 
policy has an unclear impact on exchange rates because the price and income effects work in opposite 
directions. The income effect leads to a weaker cmrency exchange rate, while the price effect leads to a 
strengthened cuiTency exchange rate. 
"Unless they are fully anticipated, changes in the monetary expansion are likely to have at least temporary real 
effects, and even anticipated changes in the money supply might have real effects in the fact of long-term 
contracts and other somces of wage and price rigidity"Frenkel & Mussa (1980). 
2.1.7. Expectations 
An important role is played by expectations in the theory of exchange rate determination. CuiTent exchange 
rates are determined by what expectations of future exchange rates investors have. Expectations are mainly 
founded on information that sends a signal to investors. Signals of future exchange rate movements are what 
drive speculation. 
Findings of surveys indicate that the short-term or high-frequency exchange rate fluctuations are caused by 
speculation or the herding behavior of investors that cause them to follow trends in the market; rather than 
macroeconomic fundamentals Hossain (2008). 
Calvo & Mendoza (2000) an·ive at the concept of "rational contagion" as a cause of high volatility in emerging 
financial markets. They describe this as a scenario where investors make a choice not to pay for infmmation as 
it is expensive and instead make their investment decisions based on rumors. 
When investors make decisions based on unverified rumors, depending on the nature and expectations of the 
future, they produce large capital flows into and out of the country. Ideally, positive jlews encourages capital 
inflows, and negative news causes negative outflows. As a consequence, the capital flows generate significant 
volatility in the cun·ency markets Hays, Freeman, & Nesseth (2003). 
During politically uncetiain periods, rumors are in abundant supply. During campaign and election periods of 
Kenya in particular, rumors tend to be negative, and there are major security concerns. All this negativity 
creates a skewed perception on the side of investors. Due to the abundance of rumors, investor behavior is likely 
to be more erratic. 
8 
2.2. Causes of exchange rate volatility 
There has been an ongoing controversy about the cause-effect relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
other variables. Some are of the opinion that exchange rate volatility has worsened inflation-unemployment 
tradeoffs and caused harsh cycles of inflation and depreciation. However, there are those whose perspective is 
that the cause-effect relationship runs in the opposite direction. Economic variables, underlying financial 
conditions, and policies primarily cause exchange rate volatility. 
Habeler (1954) in this study is among those who believe that macroeconomic instability is the primary cause of 
volatility of exchange rates rather than vice-versa. 
2.3. Exchange rate regimes 
The Bretton Woods system was established after the Second World War. It required countries to have a pegged 
exchange rate tied to the value of gold. Its main goals were to achieve a balance of payments for countries and 
the prevention of competitive devaluation of currencies. However, in the 1960s, some economists were of the 
idea that the system of pegged exchange rates despite its benefits, was not worth the costs it imposed. They 
believed that a more flexible exchange rate was of great need. 
In the August of 1971, the Bretton Woods system officially came to an end, and the pegged rate system 
collapsed. Many industrialized countries exchange rates against the dollar remained flexible but have been 
heavily regulation and intervention imposed on occasion. A major criticism of the pegged exchange rate system 
is the attempt to rescue it by the use of trade restrictions. The irony in this is that one of the intended purposes of 
the pegged exchange rate system was to promote trade McKinnon (2010); Mundell (1961). A fixed exchange 
rate reduces the volatility of exchange rates and as a consequence reduces exchange rate risk. 
However, a study by Haberler(1954) argues that a pegged exchange rate is less flexible in comparison to a 
floating rate. Willett (1976) is of a similar opinion. A major criticism is that empirical evidence shows that the 
macroeconomic performance has been extremely poor in the floating exchange rate era when compared to the 
pegged exchange rate era. Kohlhagen (1977) gives unbiased evidence that on average the accuracy with which 
subsequent spot rates are predicted by forwarding rates has deteriorated. Similarly, bid-ask spreads were not as 
wide in the pegged exchange rate system when compared to floating exchange rates. 
2.4. Implications of political risk 
2.4.1. FDI 
A major concern for governments especially those of developing countries is how to attract foreign direct 
investment. This happens to have even greater complexities for developing countries that have a particularly 
high political risk. Kobrin (1979) argues that a country may be unable or unwilling to provide a favorable 
political environment for FDI. Unwillingness arises mostly from the policymakers' choices in unfavorable 
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policies, and inability mostly arises from social unrest and inability raising security concerns. Similarly, Butler 
& Joaquin(1998) argue that for a multinational to undertake FDI in a country with relatively high political risk, 
it will require a higher return on its investment. 
Le & Zak (2006) show that capital flight occurs due to political risk in the host countries. However, political 
risk in foreign countries may also affect the FDI of the local country. If the country of origin is experiencing 
higher political risk, the FDI inflow from that particular country is most likely to increase Aguiar, Aguiar-
Conraria, Gulamhussen, & Magalhaes (2012). Political risk has a negative effect on FDI but is more significant 
in developing countries. Extensive research has been done, and many models have been developed with 
political risk as a variable in the determination of FDI inflows Bennett & Green(1972). 
2.4.2. Economic Performance: Growth 
In 1992, economic growth shrunk by 0.8%. In 1997, growth was 0.5%. In 2002, economic growth was only a 
mere 0.55% deteriorating from the previous growth of 3.8% in the previous year. In 2003, growth increased 
approximately four times to 2.23%. In 2008, the country exhibited economic growth of only 0.25% after a 
tremendous growth of 7% in 2007. 
2.4.3. Inflation 
If the purchasing power parity holds, higher inflation calls for higher spot rates. The relationship between 
inflation and exchange rates is quite simple. On average, inflation rates that are well above the world average 
tend to have depreciating exchange rates. Similarly, inflation rates that are substantially below the world 
average tend to have appreciating exchange rates. 
However, this may not always be the exposition, and there may exist instances when purchasing power parity 
does not hold. Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996) argues that in a majority of situations, it is found that political risk will 
lead to real appreciation or depreciation of exchange rates regardless of country classification according to 
income or region. There are instances where developing countries with high prices exhibit appreciating 
exchange rates. Both points of view have a similar view that real exchange rates are impacted by political risk. 
The study argues that high inflation rates are more variable than low inflation rates, and hence generally 
generate great uncertainty Ackley(1978). For the case of Kenya in particular, inflation is higher in election 
years. 
2.4.4. Bonds and Stocks 
Lin & Roberts (2001) demonstrate how in Taiwan certain stocks exhibited an abnormal return as a result of the 
effect of expectations of investors. The expectations were during a period of political uncertainty as the 
investors were unsure of the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. 
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Similarly, Pantzalis, Stangeland, & Turtle(2000) discovered that the weeks before elections exhibited the 
strongest abnormal returns in stock price movements. They attributed this discovery to the high political 
uncet1ainty during the final weeks of campaign activity. According to Schwe11 (1989), the high volatility 
exhibited in the US stock markets during the great depression of 1929 to 1939 could be attributed to the 
political uncet1ainty regarding whether or not the capitalist system would survive in the US. 
2.4.5. Exchange Rates 
Brada et al. (1993); Kutan & Zhou (1995) conducted an empirical study on 36 countries -both industrial and 
developing- on how spreads vary with the variability of exchange rate volatility and country risk. They 
particularly focused on the politically risky events in South Africa and its effect on the rand spread: 
demonstrations, armed attacks, and related deaths. Time series evidence yielded estimates that the spread on the 
South African rand increased during the particular occurrences. They also concluded that the greater the 
intensity of the risk events in a country, the greater the conditional variance of spot exchange rates. 
Bernhard & Leblang (2002) investigate the impact of parliamentary processes on the volatility of exchange 
rates. Using daily data from four currencies: British pound, French franc and Swedish krona they obtained 
results that volatility of exchange rates is often increased by political events. 
In Kenya, Ntwiga (2012) examined the effects of the 2007/2008 post-election violence shocks on foreign 
currency exchange rates. He concluded that a shift in volatility will always occur when market equilibrium 
changes due to economic and political reasons . 
. OCHIENG (2013) conducted an empirical study examining the effect of political risk on exchange rates in 
Kenya. His main results were based on the event study methodology conducted between May 20 1 0 and April 
2013. He used daily time series data of 3 currencies: American dollar, Euro, and Ugandan Shilling. From his 
results, he observed that politically risky events had a statistically significant effect on the dollar, the Ugandan 
shilling showed no significant relationship and the Euro showed a very minimal reaction. 
2.5. Political risk in developed vs. developing countries 
Hausmann, Panizza, & Rigobon (2006) conducted a study on the real effective exchange rate (REER) volatility 
in developed and developing countries. From a sample of 74 countries and data from 1980 to 2000, they 
concluded that REER volatility is around three times lower in developed countries than in developing countries. 
They attributed the difference in the long-run volatility to the persistence of volatility; but not magnitude or 
frequency of shocks. 
2.6. GARCH models 
GARCH stands for the general autoregressive conditional variance. It was first proposed by Bollerslev in 1986. 
It is a modification of ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity). Conditional implies a dependence 
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of observations on the immediate past. GARCH is a mechanism that includes past variances in the explanation 
of future variances. 
Foreign exchange markets couple high persistent periods of volatility and tranquility with significant fat tailed 
behavior. GARCH is appropriate as takes into account the fat tailed behavior (excess kurtosis) and volatility 
clustering of exchange rates Braun, Nelson, & Sunier(1995) posit that if shocks to volatility persist for long 
periods, then changes in asset prices due to volatility movements can be large, and the GARCH model can be 
used to capture volatility clustering. 
It is evident that there are many difficulties that arise in the direct estimation of equilibrium exchange rates. 
This increases the impmiance of exchange rate analysis involving he investigation of the time series prope11ies 
of the behavior of exchange rates. This type of analysis can't prove the efficiency of speculation so that 
equilibrium conditions changes are a reflection of the observed exchange rate volatilities. However, such 
analysis can be used to rule out the empirical relevance of particular types of hypotheses about badly behaved 
speculation. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
This chapter outlines the research methodology the study adopted. It covers the research design, population of 
the study, sampling methods used, data collection methods and data analysis techniques. 
3.1. Research design 
Research design provides guidelines that direct the researcher towards solving the problem and may vary 
depending on the nature of the problem being studied. 
This study adopted the descriptive research design. A descriptive research attempts to get the descriptive 
existing phenomenon by exploring the existing status of two or more variables at a given position time hence 
was the most suited to this research. 
3.2. Population sampling 
This study intended to cover the period from June 2007 to August 2013 . This period covers three major political 
events: the 2007 general elections, the 2010 constitutional referendum, and the 2013 general election. 
The currencies for the study are the USD and EURO. The basis for the sample selection is as follows: the USD 
is the dominant foreign currency traded in the world and also the most widely held. The EURO is the cuiTency 
used in the largest trading bloc in the world: the European Union and the second most traded currency Hawkins, 
J., & Masson, P. (2003). 
3.3. Data collection 
This research purely used secondary sources of data. Data was retrieved from Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya 
national bureau of statistics (KNBS) and Kenyan newspapers. The data collected was the daily quoted exchange 
rates for the cmTencies under this study. 
3.4. The model 
3.4.1 Log Price Relative (LPR) 
The LPR can be considered an adequate measure of exchange rate returns Cai, Chen &Fang (20 1 0). The 
following are reasons: 
i) Change in natural log ~ percentage change 
Infinitesimally changes in the natural log of a variable are approximately equal to percentage changes to a very 
close approximation. This property of the natural log function is defined by 
LN(l + r) ~ r 
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ii) Errors measured in natural-log units ~ percentage errors 
Enors in the predicted logged series are approximately equivalent to the percentage en·ors in predicting the 
original series. 
iii) Coefficients in log-log regressions ~ proportional percentage changes 
The negligible impact of one variable on the expected value of another is linearly approximate and proportional 
to the percentage changes. Therefore, applying a diff-log transformation to both dependent and independent 
variables may be appropriate. The exchange rate returns are obtained as follows: 
Yc = In (...!.i__) = In(Xc) - ln(Xc_1 ) 
Xt-1 
Where: 
Ycis the LPR (rate) at time t, and 
X cis the exchange rate at timet. 
3.4.2 Volatility Description and Measurement 
The risk of an asset return is at times explained by the volatility of the asset retum. Statistically, it's represented 
by the standard deviation. 
Where: 
rt is the log-normal return on day t, and 
11 is the average return over the T -day period. 
In this paper, the exchange rate volatility was depicted as the volatility of the LPR. 
3.4.3 The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) Model 
Consider the return equation based on Cai, Chen &Fang (2010) for exchange rates: 
Where flt is the mean LPR over a period of time. 
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at=residual returns with at= UtEt where Et is a random walk and is 8'f is the conditional variance 
The GARCH model is used to model changes in the variance of the LPR of some financial data Dukich, Kim, & 
Lin (2010). The GARCH model is appropriate as it takes into account excess kurtosis in the distribution of 
exchange rate returns (heavy-tailed distribution). It also considers that the variance of time series is not 
constant, and in which the variance of one period is dependent on the variance of the previous period. The 
GARCH model can be expressed as: 
8'f = w + {J(L)8'f-k + a(L)rd 
Where 8'f is called the conditional variance. B(L) and a(L) are polynomials of the lag operators and 1JE = Yt -
f1 which is known as the ilmovation. The variance at time t is a function of the variance at time t - i and the 
innovation at time t. The GARCH model with lag parameters ~P and aq are referred to as GARCH(p,q) 
Bollerslev (1986,1987). 
Alternatively, GARCH (p,q) could be expressed as: 
p q 
u'f = a0 +I aia;_i +I {Jju(_j 
i=l j=l 
Where: 
a0 , a/sand {J[ s are constants. 
We will be using a GARCH (1,1) which is defined by 
Where: 
A GARCH model can be extended to reflect or model the leverage effect. A leverage effect is the relationship 
between asset returns stating that as volatility increases then stock prices fall. This leverage effect is model 
using a threshold GARCH (TGARCH). A TGARCH (1,1) is defined below: 
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Where: 
Dt_ 1 is the dummy variable for political risk.Beaulie, Cosset &Essaddam (2005); Cai, Chen and Fang (20 1 0) 
similarly use a dummy variable for political risk in both their models. 
Dt-1 = {~ if at-1 < 0 •t > 0. L at-1 -
y 1 > 0 is a constant. 
All the other variables are as previously defined. 
Note that at_1 < 0 implies that the days are politically risky, otherwise at_1 ~ 0 implies that the days are not 
politically risky. 
Also note that a positive at_1 will contribute a 1 a~_1 to af , and a negative at_1 has a larger impact (a1 + 
Y!)a~_ 1 . The model uses zero as its threshold to distinguish the impact of past shocks (news). 
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Chapter Four: Data Analysis 
Analysis of the data was conducted using E-views. 
4.1. Log euro heteroskedasticity tests 
Log_Euro 
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The magnitude of the seasonal changes is greater when the data values are greater, and therefore the seasonal 
changes are multiplicative. The magnitude of the seasonal change increases over time as the data values 
mcrease. 
Heteros k:eda:sticit>..i Test: ·•.'\•·t-.ite 
F -:stati :sti c 
O o :s'* R-:s q uared 
Scaled e x plaine d SS 
Test Equation: 
12 .. 23874 
·t2.17631 
35.38404 
Depend ent './ariab le : RESID"-2 
f•.-lethod : Least Squares 
Date: 11/ 22l 17 Time: 11 :36 
Samp·le : 2 1998 
Inclu d ed o b :sen.t ation:s: 1997 
Prob . F ( 1, 1 995 ) 
Pro b . Ch i -Square ( 1 ) 
Pro b . Cl-. i-Square(1 ~· 
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
\ l aria b le 
c 
POLITIC.A.L~RISK"'2 
R-:s q uar e d 
.A.dj usted R-:squared 
S . E . of re g ressio n 
Su m :squared re:sid 
Lo g li k elihoo d 
F-:stati :sti c 
Pro b ( F-:stati sti c ) 
Coefficient 








0.000 4 -78 
Std. Error 
3.81 E-0 6 
1.57E-05 
t ·-Stati :sti c 
16.9'1725 
3. 4-98391 
J l ean depen d ent v ar 
S.D. depend ent v ar 
.A.k:ai k e i n fo criteri o n 
Schvv·arz c ri t e rion 
Hannan-Ouinn criter. 
Durb in-··.•vatson stat 
17 









- 1 4-.57221 
- -14-_5757 6 
1. 4 86733 
F -statistic 
The F -statistic is simply a ratio of two variances. Variances are a measure of dispersion, or how far the data are 
scattered from the mean. Larger values represent greater dispersion. At this point, the F-statistic is used to 
assess whether the variance is heteroscedastic. F-statistic is defined by 
The hypothesis is defined as: 
Null hypothesis: The variances are constant over time. 
Alternative hypothesis: The variances vary over time. 
For an F-statistic, if the critical value is greater than the level of significance a = 0.05, then reject the null 
hypothesis. The F-statistic is 12.38 which is greater than the level of significance and thus the null hypothesis is 
rejected and concludes that the variances vary over time, that is heteroskedastic. 
R-squared and Adjusted R-squared 
R-squared is a statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line. It is also known as the 
coefficient of determination, or the coefficient of multiple detennination for multiple regressions. Adjusted R-
squared is usually adjusted for the degrees of freedom. The adjusted R-squared is a modified version ofR-
squared that has been adjusted for the number of predictors in the model. The adjusted R-squared increases 
only if the new term improves the model more than would be expected by chance. It decreases when a predictor 
improves the model by less than expected by chance. R-squared is defined by 
Adjusted R-squared is defined by 
Rz• = 1 - _(1_-_R_z)_(N_-_1_) 
N-p-1 
Where p is the number of predictors and N is the total sample size. 
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R-squared in our case is 0.006097 and adjusted R-squared is 0.005599 implying that the model explains 0.56% 
of the data's variation around its mean. 
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Akaike Information Criterion 
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is an estimator of the relative quality of statistical models for a given 
set of data. Given a collection of models for the data, AIC estimates the quality of each model, relative to each 
of the other models. Thus, AIC provides a means for model selection. AIC is defined by 
AIC = 2k- 2ln(L) 
Where [is the maximum value ofthe likelihood function, and k is the number of parameters to be estimated. 
The value of AIC in this case is -14.58. 
Schwarz Criterion 
The Schwarz criterion is also called the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). This is a criterion for model 
selection among a finite set of models; the model with the lowest BIC is prefeiTed. It is based, in pmi, on the 
likelihood function and it is closely related to the Akaike information criterion (AIC). BIC is defined by 
BIC = ln(n) k- 2ln(L) 
Where L is the maximum value of the likelihood function, n is the sample size, and k is the number of 
parameters to be estimated. 
The SIC for this case is -14.5722. 
Durbin-Watson Test 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is a test statistic that is used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals. The Durbin Watson test looks for a specific type of serial correlation, the AR(l) process. The 
Hypotheses for the Durbin Watson test are: 
Null hypothesis: No first order autocoiTelation. 
Alternative hypothesis: First order correlation exists. (For a first order correlation, the lag is one time unit). 
Assumptions are: 
1. That the enors are normally distributed with a mean of 0. 
2. The errors m·e stationary. 
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The Durbin-Watson (DW) test statistic is defined by 
The Durbin Watson test reports a test statistic, with a value from 0 to 4, where: 
1. 2 is no autocorrelation. 
2. 0 to <2 is positive autocorrelation (common in time series data). 
3. >2 to 4 is negative autocorrelation (less common in time series data). 
From the data, the DW test statistic is 1.49 implying that there is a positive autocorrelation. Since the test 
statistic is greater than the level of significancea = 0.05, reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
exists a first-order correlation. 
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The magnitude of the seasonal change increases over time as the data values increase. 
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The F-statistic is 27.99 which is greater than the level of significance and hence reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the variances vary over time, that is heteroskedastic. 
R-squared and Adjusted R-squared 
R-squared is 0.0138 and adjusted R-squared is 0.01334 implying that the model explains 1.334% of the data's 
variation around its mean. 
Akaike Information Criterion 




The SIC for our case is -15.09.This shows that the EURO is a better model than the USD but by a small margin. 
Durbin-Watson Test 
The Hypotheses for the Durbin Watson test are: 
Null hypothesis: No first order autoconelation. 
Alternative hypothesis: First order con·elation exists. 
From the data, the DW test statistic is 1.42 implying that there is a positive autocorrelation. Since the test 
statistic is greater than the level of significance a = 0.05, reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
exists a first-order correlation. 
4.3. GARCH (1,1) euro returns 
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Z-statistic 
A Z-test is any statistical test for which the distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis can be 
approximated by a normal distribution. Because of the central limit theorem, many test statistics are 
approximately nmmally distributed for large samples. For a one sample Z-test, the Z score is defined by: 
X-Jl Z=-
a 
The hypotheses test is: 
for n > 30 
Null hypothesis: Are the variables independent. 
Alternative hypothesis: Are the variables dependent. 
The probability of the Z test is known as the p-value. If the p-value is less than the level of significance, reject 
the null hypothesis. The p-value for the variables C and political risk are 0.0238 and 0.0372 respectively, which 
are less than the level of significance, a = 0.05 and therefore rejected the null hypothesis and concluded that 
the variables are dependent. 
R-squared and Adjusted R-squared 
R-squared in our case is -0.0017 and adjusted R-squared is -0.0022 implying that the model explains (0.22)% of 
the data's variation around its mean. 
Akaike Information Criterion 
The value of AIC in our case is -7.03. 
Schwarz Criterion 
The SIC for our case is -7.015. 
Durbin-Watson Test 
The Hypotheses for the Durbin Watson test are: 
Null hypothesis: No first order autocorrelation. 
Alternative hypothesis: First order correlation exists. 
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From the data, the DW test statistic is 1.9953 implying that there is a positive autocoiTelation. Since the test 
statistic is greater than the level of significancea = 0.05, the null hypothesisis rejected and conclude that there 
exists a first-order correlation. 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
The Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQC) is a criterion for model selection. It IS an alternative 
to Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC). It is given as 
HIC = -2Lmax + 2kln(ln(n)) 
Where Lmax is the log-likelihood, k is the number of parameters, and n is the number of observations. 
In our case, the HIC value is -7.0234. 
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25 
2.46E-08 
0 . 0 1 4531 
0.007065 
8.82-1516 
1 9 .. 2.01 11 
1 09 .7672 
f· lean dependent v a r 
S .D . d ependent v ar 
.A.k a.i k e info criterion 
S chV'.o·a rz. criteri on 
Hannan-Guinn cri ter. 
P r o b . 
0.0358 
0. 1 071 
0.00 00 
0.0000 
0 .0 0 0 0 
-8.79 E -05 
0.0054 27 
- 8.45 1 3 45 
- 8 .4 37326 
- 8 .446197 
Alternative hypothesis: Are the variables dependent. 
The p-value of the variable C is 0.0358 which is less than the level of significance, a = 0.05 and therefore the 
null hypothesis is rejected and concludes that the variable C is dependent. The p-value of the political risk 
variable is 0.1071 which is greater than the level of significance a = 0.05 and therefore fail to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the variable is independent. 
R-squared and Adjusted R-squared 
R-squared in our case is -0.00148 and adjusted R-squared rs -0.00199 implying that the model explains 
(0.199)% of the data's variation around its mean. 
Akaike Information Criterion 
The value of AIC in our case is -8.45 . The smaller the AIC, the better the model. The GARCH (1 ,1) Euro 
model has a smaller AIC than the GARCH (1, 1) USD model hence the Euro is a better model. 
Schwarz Criterion 
The SIC for our case is -8.437. The smaller the BIC, the better the model. The GARCH (1,1) Euro model has a 
smaller BIC than the GARCH (1,1) USD model hence the Euro is a better model. 
Durbin-Watson Test 
The Hypotheses for the Durbin Watson test are: 
Null hypothesis: No first order autocorrelation. 
Alternative hypothesis: First order correlation exists. 
From the data, the DW test statistic is 1.833 implying that there is a positive autocorrelation. Since the test 
statistic is greater than the level of significance a = 0.05, reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
exists a first-order correlation. 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
In our case, the HIC value is -8.446. The smaller the HIC, the better the model. The GARCH (1 ,1) Euro model 
has a smaller HIC than the GARCH (1 ,1) USD model hence the Euro is a better model. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The study used various test statistics to test for: 
1. Heteroscedasticity. 




The study used the F-statistic to test for heteroscedasticity in two models: Log Euro and Log USD. Both models 
are heteroscedastic. 
5.2. Model selection 
The study used various inf01mation criterions such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
Information Criterion (BIC), and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC) to determine which model is 
the best fit. We have also used R-squared and adjusted R-squared to determine the model fit, that is how close 
the data are to the fitted regression line. The following is a table representing all the information criterions 
tested: 
AIC BIC HIC/HQC 
Log Euro -14.578 -14.572 -14.576 
LogUSD -15.098 -15.093 -15.096 
GARCH (1, 1) Euro -7.029 -7 .015 -7.023 
GARCH (1,1) USD -8.451 -8.437 -8.446 
The smaller the information criterion, the better the fit of the model. Comparing the log Emo and the GARCH 
(1 ,1) Euro, GARGH (1,1) Emo has a smaller AIC, BIC and HQC than the log Emo which is actually half the I 
information criterion of the log Euro and this implies that the GARCH (1 ,1) Euro is a better model than the log I 
Euro. Comparing the log USD and the GARCH (1,1) USD, the GARCH (1 ,1) USD has smaller information 
criterions compared to the log USD which is actually half the information criterions of the log USD and this 
implies that the GARCH (1 ,1) USD is a better model than the log USD. 
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The model also used R-squared and adjusted R-squared to determine how much of the model is explained by 
the predictor/explanatory variable. Adjusted R-squared is a modified value of R-squared that is adjusted to the 
degrees of freedom of the predictors. The following table shows the values of the adjusted R-squared for the 
four models: 
Model Adjusted R-squar·ed 
Log Euro 0.56% 
LogUSD 1.33% 
GARCH ( 1,1) Euro (0.22)% 
GARCH (1,1) USD (0.199)% 
5.3. Dependency 
The model used the Z-statistic to test for the dependence of the variables in the GARCH (1, 1) Euro and USD 
models. The following table shows the results probability of the Z statistics or the p-values: 
c Political Risk 
GARCH ( 1,1) Euro 0.0238 0.0372 
GARCH (1, 1) USD 0.0358 0.1071 
The p-values of the variable C in both the GARCH (1, 1) Euro and USD models are less than the level of 
significance a = 0.05 implying that the variables are dependent. The p-values of the political risk variables in 
GARCH (1 ,1) Euro and GARCH (1 ,1) USD are 0.0372 and 0.1071 respectively, which are less than and greater 
h a r ct h n ll h t an the SI0 mficance level therefore eJe edt e u yp othesis in GRACH 1 1 ( , ) Euro and failed to re · ect the 
null hypothesis in GARCH (1 ,1) USD. This implies that the political risk variable in GARCH (1 ,1) Euro is 
dependent whereas the political risk variable in the GARCH ( 1,1) USD is partially dependent. 
5.4. Autocorrelation 
The model used the Durbin-Watson test statistic in the four models to determine if the models are auto-
con·elated. The Durbin Watson test repmis a test statistic, with a value from 0 to 4, where: 2 is no 
autocorrelation, 0 to <2 is positive autoconelation (conm1on in time series data), and >2 to 4 is negative 
autoconelation (less common in time series data). The table below shows the DW test statistics for the four 
models: 
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Model DW Statistic 
Log Euro 1.49 
Log USD 1.42 
GARCH (1 , 1) Euro 1.995 
GARCH (1, 1) USD 1.83 
All the models have a Durbin-Watson test statistic that lies between 0 and 2 implying that they all have a 
positive autocorrelation. 
5.5 Limitations 
There was a difficulty in obtaining data from all the trading days for the exchange rates. However, majority of 
the observations had reliable sources. 
A major limitation was that during some of the politically risky periods, other events were occurnng. 
Particularly in the 2007/2008 period, the global financial crisis was also taking place. There is a possibility that 
this too contributed to the excess volatilities but there is no certain way of separating the effects from both. 
5.6 Recommendations 
Additional studies could be done to investigate the effects of political risk on other major cunencies, for 
example rates the Japanese yen (JPY), the British pound (GBP), etc. 
Similarly, further research is necessary to establish the effects of both negative and positive political shocks on 
the Kenyan economy. A particular focus could be put a comparison between the reactions for positive and 
negative shocks. 
5. 7. Summary 
Volatility models have been applied in a wide variety of applications. In most cases, volatility is itself an 
interesting aspect ofthe problem. In some cases, volatility is an input used for purposes of measurement, like in 
the example of esttmatmg the value at nsk. In other cases, volatility may be a causal vanable, as m models 
expected volatility is a dete1minant of expected returns. We model the conditional volatility of the EURO and 
USD exchange rates using a TGARCH(1 ,1) model with a political risk dummy. We reject the null hypothesis 
in GRACH (1 ,1) Euro and fail to reject the null hypothesis in GARCH (1 ,1) USD. This implies that the political 
risk variable in GARCH (1,1) Euro is dependent whereas the political risk variable in the GARCH (1,1) USD is 
partially dependent. In general, the results of the analysis suggest that the Kenyan market reacts to political risk 
causing higher volatility i.e. there is a shift in volatility when market equilibrium changes due to political risk. 
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